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THE PROPRIETY OF RETAINING GIBRALTAR IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

IT is a ſingular circumſtance, that thoſe who are the warmeſt friends to the Independence of America; who think that Independence cannot too ſpeedily be acknowledged; who are of opinion, that ſuch a ſtep ſhould be taken unconditionally, and ought not to be conſidered as the price of peace; hold forth Gibraltar, at the ſame time, as an invaluable poſſeſſion, which on no conſideration whatſoever ought to be relinquiſhed; preferring thus, to all appearance, a few acres of barren rock, to the largeſt and moſt fertile extent of

territory that ever a nation was poſſeſſed of.

Such a whimſical political paradox would not have required any particular diſcuſſion, had it not been ſupported by ſome very reſpectable individuals, who have given the Public their ſentiments on the ſubject. Unable to contend with their ingenuity, the author of the following tract ſatisfies himſelf with a ſhort ſtatement of plain facts, which he is convinced will weigh more with men of ſenſe and judgement, than any laboured attempt at oratory or declamation. He thinks the queſtion is of the moſt eſſential conſequence to the future happineſs and proſperity of this Country. After

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ſo long a war, which has ſo much exhauſted the public reſources, it is full time that a laſting and durable peace ſhould be concluded. No peace, however, can be durable and laſting, if Gibraltar remains in our poſſeſſion, the link which binds the Houſe of Bourbon together, and renders us the general object of the jealouſy of Europe.

THE author indeed is of opinion, that the poſſeſſion of America has been ſacrificed to the retention of Gibraltar. That darling object could alone have induced Spain to countenance the Independence of our Colonies, and without her aſſiſtance that event could never have taken

taken place. If that fortreſs is retained, it is not a peace, but a truce merely that will be concluded. In a very ſhort ſpace of time, a new war will break forth, we ſhall have the united Houſe of Bourbon again to contend with, and a new conflict to ſuſtain, equally bloody and expenſive as the preſent. Any peace, in the exiſting circumſtances of this country, with diſtracted councils and a diſpirited people, muſt be diſhonourable; but to make a bad peace with the certainty of its being ſpeedily broken, would be madneſs in the extreme. If a war is likely to break forth in any ſhort ſpace of time, *now* is the time to exert ourſelves, whilſt we are able, with any tolerable

tolerable management, to fit out any fleet we could deſire, at leaſt greatly to ſurpaſs any naval exertion in the power of our enemies.

THERE is but one circumſtance that could poſſibly render it deſirable to retain Gibraltar. A plan was formerly propoſed, of a union between this country and the Powers of the North, as a counter-balance to the Family-Compact. Could our pledging ourſelves to retain that poſſeſſion be any inducement to thoſe Powers actually to enter into ſuch a union, it would be a very different queſtion indeed. If ſuch are the wiſhes of the States I have alluded to, it is full time that they

ſhould

ſhould ſpeak out; for we can no longer ſacrifice our blood and treaſure in compliance with the *wiſhes* of thoſe, who can tamely ſee us waging a hazardous warfare with ſuch a hoſt of enemies.

To conclude: whether we are to have peace or war, it is right to diſcuſs the queſtion, that the Public may be enabled to form a decided opinion upon ſo important a ſubject.

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PROPRIETY, &c.

IT will be difficult for poſterity to conceive, how this Country could poſſibly withſtand the formidable confederacy that has been formed againſt her, without ſuffering any loſs which was not either trifling in itſelf, or amply compenſated by the advantages which ſhe has obtained. When other ſtates have been attacked by ſome powerful alliance, they have either ſunk before it, or have been obliged to accept of terms degrading and humiliating; whereas, at this moment, whoever impartially

conſiders the preſent relative ſituations of the belligerent powers, can hardly heſitate to declare, that Britain is in every reſpect as able as any of her enemies to proſecute the war.

No real friend and well-wiſher, however, to the proſperity of this Country, can be deſirous of continuing the war any longer, could an honourable peace be obtained. It is hardly poſſible to expect, that we ſhould be able to obtain advantages equivalent to the expence we muſt incur by another campaign. The hour of victory is the time for peace; nor can there be a better period for entering into a negociation, than whilſt no other event has effaced the impreſſion made upon the enemy, by the ſkill and gallantry which has been diſplayed, in the courſe of laſt ſummer, by Britiſh ſoldiers and Britiſh ſeamen. A negociation has been actually begun; and the object of the following paper is ſhortly and candidly to conſider, how far a demand on the part of Spain of the reſtoration of Gibraltar, ought to be accounted

counted a ſufficient obſtacle to the concluſion of the treaty. The ſubject naturally divides itſelf into three parts; namely, what right Great Britain has to the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar? of what importance it is to this country? and, whether it would be for the intereſt of Great Britain to reſtore that fortreſs to the Spaniards, for a juſt and adequate equivalent?

1. The neceſſity of curbing the aſpiring ambition of Louis the Fourteenth having induced ſeveral European ſtates to enter into a ſtrict alliance with each other; England, as might be expected from her ſuperior power, and from her enmity to France, took the lead in aſſerting the liberties and independence of Europe. The object, however (of the Succeſſion War, as it has been called), was not to obtain perſonal acquiſitions to the Crown of Great Britain, but to procure an equitable and reaſonable ſatisfaction to his Imperial Majeſty for his pretenſions to the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, and a ſufficient ſecurity to Great Britain and Hol-

land for their dominions, and for the commerce of their ſubjects. There was an article indeed in the treaty of alliance, by which the maritime powers were permitted by common advice, and for the benefit and enlargement of their trade and navigation, to ſeize what lands and cities they could belonging to the Spaniſh dominions in the Indies, and to conſider ſuch acquiſitions as their own *; but no idea was entertained that any of the allies could, by virtue of that treaty, appropriate to themſelves any portion of the monarchy of Spain in Europe.

In the courſe of this war, an armament was fitted out by the allies, conſiſting partly of Engliſh and partly of Dutch ſhips †, who, underſtanding that the important fortreſs of Gibraltar was only garriſoned by 150 men ‡, thought that a

* See the Second Grand Alliance between the Emperor, England, and Holland, anno 1701, Articles 2 & 6.

† See Lediard's Naval Hiſtory, vol. 2. p. 789. In note E he remarks, that 16 Engliſh and 6 Dutch ſhips were employed to cannonade the town of Gibraltar.

‡ Burchet in his Naval Hiſtory ſays only about fourſcore; ſee p. 678.

favourable

favourable opportunity for an attack. After a ſiege of three days, the place was ſurrendered; but the prince of Heſſe, who commanded the troops on that occaſion, ſummoned the governor to ſurrender to his Catholic Majeſty Charles III. king of Spain, in whoſe name the place was taken poſſeſſion of on the 24th of July 1704, and to whom, by the 5th article of capitulation, ſuch of the inhabitants as continued to reſide there, were to take an oath of fidelity *

DURING the remainder of the war, there was every reaſon to imagine from the conduct of England, that ſhe conſidered herſelf as holding the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar for that prince, whoſe pretenſions to the Spaniſh monarchy ſhe ſupported. In the Declaration that was publiſhed by the earl of Peterborough on the 1ſt of May 1705, when he arrived on the coaſt of Catalonia, it is expreſsly declared, that the queen of England had ſent her forces into thoſe parts to main-

* See Lediard's Naval Hiſtory, vol. 2. p. 789 and 790. Berkeley's Naval Hiſtory, p. 594.

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tain the juſt right of the Houſe of Auſtria to the monarchy of Spain, and not to take poſſeſſion of any place in the name of her Britannick Majeſty *; and the firſt public information of a contrary ſyſtem was contained in the queen's ſpeech to both houſes of parliament, on the 6th of June 1712, wherein it is ſaid, "That the Mediterranean trade, "and the Britiſh intereſt and influence in "thoſe parts, will be ſecured by the poſſeſſion "of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, with the "whole iſland of Minorca, which are offered "to remain in my hands." †

It is a ſingular circumſtance, indeed, that Gibraltar and Minorca ſhould be thus *offered* to Great Britain in the month of June, though neither was contained in the ſpecific demands made by her Britannick Majeſty on the 5th of March preceding ‡.

* See Queen Anne's Declaration, in the General Collection of Treaties, vol. 4. p. 336.

† See Commons Journals, vol. 17. p. 258.

‡ See Appendix, N°. 1.

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Had there been at that time any idea of juſtice or of propriety in ſuch a demand, it ſurely would have been at leaſt inſinuated in the paper to which I have alluded: and who can hear of ſuch an event without immediately perceiving, that the poſſeſſion of theſe two places was a bribe which England accepted of for the deſertion of her allies?

When the negociations at Utrecht indeed were originally begun, it would appear that a very different plan was in contemplation. Amongſt other preliminaries which were ſuppoſed at that time to have been agreed to, it was underſtood, "That for the ſecurity of "the Engliſh and Dutch trade with Spain, "Philip conſented that the port of Cales "ſhould be always garriſoned by the En-"gliſh, and that full liberty ſhould be given "to the South Sea Company to eſtabliſh "themſelves on the Continent of South "America, according to the act of parlia-"ment.*" Who can doubt but the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar and Minorca was offered

* See Hiſtory of the Treaty of Utrecht, p. 159 and 164.

to

to England as ſome compenſation for relinquiſhing that important preliminary; which might poſſibly be conſidered as of leſs value, becauſe the Dutch had ſome ſhare in the advantages which it held forth?

ENGLAND was thus unfortunately prevailed upon, by the inſidious arts of France and Spain, to give up the general intereſt of the allies for her own ſuppoſed emolument; and by the ſeparate treaty that was concluded with Spain, on the 13th of July 1713, "His "Catholic Majeſty, for himſelf his heirs and "ſucceſſors, yielded to the King of Great "Britain the full and entire propriety of "the town and caſtle of Gibraltar, to be held "and enjoyed abſolutely with all manner of "right for ever, without any exception or "impediment whatſoever.†"

LITTLE doubt, however, can be entertained that this article, and the other one with reſpect to Minorca, were merely intended to give popularity to a meaſure (that of a ſeparate peace)

† See Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and Spain, anno 1713, Article 13.

which

which in England was generally deteſted; whilſt at the ſame time it was privately underſtood among the parties, that neither of thoſe places, or at leaſt Gibraltar, ſhould long remain in the poſſeſſion of this country.

INDEED, had there been any intention of retaining Gibraltar for ever in our poſſeſſion, it is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe, that we ſhould have concluded a peace without obtaining at the ſame time a ſufficient territory in its neighbourhood to maintain its garriſon and inhabitants. A few leagues along the coaſt of Andaluſia could not have been any great diſadvantage to the Spaniards, and would have proved of eſſential ſervice to us; and omitting to make that demand affords great reaſon to imagine, that it was only intended to be a mere temporary poſſeſſion.

BUT the concluſion of the article by which Gibraltar was ceded to us, ſeems to put this matter beyond all doubt; for there it is ſaid, "That in caſe it ſhall hereafter ſeem meet to "the crown of Great Britain to grant, ſell,

" or by any means to alienate therefrom, " the propriety of the ſaid town of Gibraltar, " it is hereby agreed and concluded, that " the preference of having the ſame ſhall " always be given to the crown of Spain be- " fore any other." This clauſe evidently implies, that after the peace was concluded, it was not doubted that this matter would be again reſumed, and ſome means fallen upon of reſtoring Gibraltar to the court of Spain for ſome adequate equivalent.

THUS it would appear, that the right which Great Britain has to the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar reſts upon this foundation: That having entered into a war, in conjunction with other powers, to ſupport the pretenſions of one of the candidates for the Spaniſh monarchy, with the aſſiſtance of thoſe allies, we unexpectedly conquered for him, or at leaſt in his name, an important fortreſs belonging to the monarchy which he claimed; and having concluded a ſeparate peace with his opponent, we ſecured that poſſeſſion for ourſelves, under an implied engagement, that it would

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be diſpoſed of in ſome future period for an adequate compenſation. Time, perhaps, has a little ſanctified the uſurpation: but how much at the ſame time ſhould we exclaim againſt the treachery and perfidy of France, were ſhe now to purſue the ſame ſyſtem of conduct; were ſhe, for example, under the pretence of ſupporting American Independence, to ſecure Rhode Iſland for herſelf; or, while ſhe acted as the ally to Holland, were ſhe to attempt annexing St. Euſtatius, the Cape of Good Hope, or the Iſland of Ceylon, to her other dominions.

LET us next enquire of what importance Gibraltar has been or might be to us, either in time of peace or of war.

2. VARIOUS exaggerated accounts have been publiſhed of the great commercial advantages reſulting from the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar; nor is it intended to be denied, that it is an acquiſition which ought not to be thrown away or eaſily relinquiſhed: at the ſame time it can hardly be credited, that it is completely invaluable, or a place which

ought not to be parted with on any account whatſoever.

For the trade of the Mediterranean, of which Gibraltar is boaſted of as the key, becomes every day of leſs importance in proportion to the commerce of the reſt of the world. There was a time (but that is ſome ages ago) when the trade of Europe in a manner centered in that ſea. Whilſt that was the caſe, Gibraltar might be conſidered in a commercial view as nearly invaluable; but now many other channels of commerce are open: and as the ſhare which England had in that trade is diminiſhing every day, it becomes leſs entitled to any great proportion of the public revenue of this country for its ſecurity and protection.

In time of peace, indeed, it is acknowledged that our Mediterranean commerce could be equally protected (except perhaps from the depredations of the Corſairs of Barbary), without the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar; and that the beneficial conſequences of this acquiſitio

quiſition are then in a great meaſure loſt. But in time of war, it has been trumpeted forth as the moſt valuable of all our poſſeſſions. It divides, it has been ſaid, France from France, and Spain from Spain. It ſeparates their naval ſtrength into two diſtinct and unconnected branches: and whilſt it enables us to protect our own trade, it furniſhes Great Britain with the means of annoying, if not annihilating, the commerce of its enemies.

THAT in former times the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar might be attended with conſiderable advantages in the time of war, there is ſome reaſon to believe; but the new ſyſtem that is now riſing in Europe, muſt put an end to every idea of that nature for the future. The attention that is paid by every maritime power, and in particular by France and Spain, to the increaſe of their fleets, muſt prevent Great-Britain from reaping ſuch advantages from the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar as formerly was the caſe. Thoſe advantages could only be obtained, if, in addition to a for-

formidable ſquadron at Gibraltar, ſhe had alſo a ſuperior fleet in every other quarter of the globe: for it would be abſurd to keep a force ſtationed there, unleſs we are able to block up the ports of Breſt, of Cadiz, and Toulon, and thus to prevent our Mediterranean ſquadron from running the riſk of being overwhelmed by the combined efforts of the enemy.

With regard to annoying the trade of France and Spain, whilſt an Armed Neutrality can cover with its broad mantle the property of the enemy, that argument cannot ſtand in any ſtead. It may be ſafely propheſied, that piratical plans of warfare will for the future be utterly exploded; nor will Gibraltar be retained at an enormous expence, becauſe it furniſhes Great-Britain with an opportunity of infeſting the coaſts and commerce of an enemy, whoſe reſources ſhe may be anxious to deſtroy.

But it has been ſaid, that even the preſent war has fully proved the importance of

Gibraltar;

Gibraltar; for it has taken up the whole attention of Spain, and was the ſource of the great naval advantages over the Spaniards, which Lord Rodney ſo fortunately obtained.

It is not propoſed to enter into that intricate queſtion of politicks, whether Spain would have at all entered into the preſent war, had it not been for the ſtrong deſire ſhe had for the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar; but it ſurely cannot with juſtice be aſſerted, that nothing was done by the Spaniſh monarchy in the courſe of the war, excepting at the ſiege of that fortreſs. The capture of Florida, of the Bahama Iſlands, and the deſtruction of our ſettlements in the Gulph of Honduras; their formidable preparations laſt ſummer for an attack upon the Iſland of Jamaica, and the efforts that they made to reinforce the fleet of France, in order to drive us from the Channel, and perhaps to cover a deſcent upon our coaſts are facts of a very different nature. No extraordinary

naval

naval armament ever protected for any length of time the ſiege of Gibraltar; and with regard to the troops employed there, they were not much more expenſive in its neighbourhood, than they would have been in any other part of Spain. In fact, the only extraordinary expences to which Spain put herſelf, in her zeal to obtain ſo deſirable an object, was a conſiderable quantity of powder, ball, floating batteries, and other military engines: and were the expence of both to be fairly computed, it would probably appear, that ſince the ſiege began, Great-Britain has been put to as heavy extraordinary charges on that account, as thoſe which Spain has been obliged to lay out.

THE intercepting the Caracca fleet, and the capture and deſtruction of ſeven ſail of the ſquadron commanded by Langara, were two fortunate incidents which attended the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar, in the courſe of this war: but abſurd would it be, indeed, to conſider ſuch unexpected

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ſtrokes of good fortune, as natural and eſſential concomitants of the place. Gibraltar might be in our poſſeſſion for centuries to come, without any event of that nature again coming to paſs. But if in this reſpect it was of ſervice to this Country, with what inconvenience and loſs were not the different reliefs of that place accompanied? Had the ſquadron we ſent there, the troops cooped up in that fortreſs, and the money which it has coſt, been employed in other ſervices, what greater advantages might we not have obtained? The neceſſity of relieving Gibraltar cramped all our other operations. It diſabled us from ſending a ſufficient force to the Eaſt Indies; it prevented us from diſpatching an ample ſupply of ſhips for the protection of our Weſt India iſlands, in the proper ſeaſon of the year; and compelled us to leave the coaſts and the trade of this Country occaſionally expoſed to the inſults and depredations of the enemy, which their timidity fortunately prevented from proving much

more fatal than it did; though the capture of the valuable fleet from St. Euſtatius, is acknowledged to have originated from that ſource alone.

On the whole, therefore, Gibraltar can only be accounted a feather in our cap, more ſplendid than uſeful; whoſe advantages, even in time of war, are compenſated by the inconveniencies with which it is accompanied.

Let us next enquire, whether it would be for the intereſt of Great Britain to reſtore that fortreſs to the Spaniards for a juſt and adequate equivalent?

3. It would be a fortunate circumſtance for this nation, if by any moderate conceſſions it could aſſuage the jealouſy which ſo generally prevails in Europe againſt it. But that can hardly be expected, whilſt we not only claim the ſovereignty of the ſeas, but alſo retain the poſſeſſion of places by means of that ſovereignty, out of mere

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ſpite to our neighbours. That Gibraltar is of no eſſential ſervice to us in a naval light, I have already endeavoured to demonſtrate: at the ſame time it would be impoſſible for us to retain it, unleſs we held the dominion of the ſeas. That dominion I wiſh this Country to poſſeſs, without its being ſo arrogantly and oſtentatiouſly diſplayed.

THE expence which this fortreſs requires, is another reaſon why a leſs invidious, and conſequently a leſs expenſive, equivalent ought to be accepted of. If the revenue which Gibraltar has ſwallowed up ſince it was in our poſſeſſion were to be calculated, it would amount to a ſum which would cool the zeal of the warmeſt advocates for its retention. Including the principal ſums, *with ſimple intereſt*, ſince they were laid out, at leaſt thirty millions muſt have been expended ſince the year 1704, which would have diſchaarged above fifty millions of the national debt, at the rate at which ſtocks are ſold at preſent. That

this calculation is not exaggerated, will appear from the following ſtate of a part of the expence which Gibraltar coſt for the year 1781 only.

MILITARY EXPENCE *of* GIBRALTAR, *from the 25th of* December 1780, *to 24th* December 1781.

Pay of 5861 Britiſh Trrops -	£.	110,826	3 4
Pay of 1423 Hanoverians - -		28,017	11 0½
Officers of the Garriſon - -		3749	12 3
Proviſions for the Britiſh forces per eſtimate - -		36,809	12 0
Ditto for Hanoverians - -		9364	17 1
Officers of the Garriſon, &c. -		3749	12 3
	£.	191,717	7 11½

ORDNANCE, &c.

Pay of Civil Officers, Artificers, &c.		876	0 0
To Major-General Philips for the loſs he ſuſtained by the office of Inſpector of the Artillery at Gibraltar and Minorca being diſcontinued - - -		456	5 0
Military Company of Artificers -		2247	15 10
Iron Ordnance, &c. - -		3715	14 2
A Supply of Shot, Powder, &c. -		35,830	6 8
Hire of armed Tranſports to carry Stores to North America, the WeſtIndies, and Mediterranean,			

Total £. 57,463 11 7: proportion of Gibraltar ſuppoſed to be - - -	17,463 11 7
Money iſſued to anſwer Bills of Exchange on account of Works for carrying on the current Service of Gibraltar - - -	43,380 1 7
To particulars contained in the Extraordinaries of the Army, from the 31ſt of January 1781, to the 1ſt of February 1782, on account of Gibraltar, for the Year preceding, *after deducting the Money above ſtated as voted per Eſtimate* for the Subſiſtence of the Garriſon - - - -	48,700 13 2
To Balance of Bills drawn by General Eliott for £. 39,780 4 4 not included in the foregoing State - - -	6480 4 4
	£. 350,968 0 3½

If the military expences of Gibraltar amount thus to a ſum exceeding £. 350,000, which at the ſame time does not include all the articles which a more ſtrict ſcrutiny might poſſibly diſcover; and if our naval expences, preſents to the Moors, &c. were to be added, £. 500,000 for one year in time of war would not probably be found an exaggerated calculation, without including the

the enormous ſum at which relieving this garriſon with a fleet of from 30 to 40 ſail of the line ought to be ſtated. Charges of ſo high a nature are far from being deſirable, in the preſent exhauſted ſituation of this Country.

Nor is the argument at all ill-founded, that whilſt we retain the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar, we muſt expect the perpetual jealouſy and enmity of the Spaniards. So ſenſible were the Miniſters of George I. of the truth of that propoſition, that they adviſed that monarch to write the following letter to the King of Spain:

" Sir, my brother: I have learnt with " great ſatisfaction, by the report of my " ambaſſador at your court, that your Ma- " jeſty is at laſt reſolved to remove the ob- " ſtacles that have for ſome time delayed " the entire accompliſhment of our union. " Since, from the confidence that your " Majeſty expreſſes towards me, I may

" look

" look upon the treaties which have been
" in queſtion between us as re-eſtabliſhed,
" and that accordingly the inſtruments
" neceſſary for the carrying on of the trade
" of my ſubjects will have been delivered
" out; *I do no longer ballance to aſſure your*
" *Majeſty of my readineſs to ſatisfy you with*
" *regard to your demand touching the reſtitu-*
" *tion of Gibraltar*; promiſing you to make
" uſe of the firſt favourable opportunity to
" regulate this article, with the conſent of
" my Parliament. And to give your Ma-
" jeſty a further proof of my affection, I
" have ordered my ambaſſador, as ſoon as
" the negotiation with which he has been
" charged, ſhall be finiſhed, to propoſe to
" your Majeſty new engagements to be en-
" tered into, in concert and jointly with
" France, ſuitable to the preſent conjunc-
" ture, not only for ſtrengthening our
" union, but alſo for ſecuring the tranqui-
" lity of Europe. Your Majeſty may be
" perſuaded, that, on my part, I will ſhew all
" the facility imaginable, promiſing myſelf
" that you will do the ſame for the mutual

" benefit

" benefit of our kingdoms, being moſt per-
" fectly, &c *."

EVER ſince that letter was written, Spain has conſidered herſelf as legally entitled to the reſtitution of Gibraltar. This is particularly evident from the ſecond article of the treaty of guaranty at Vienna between the Emperor and the King of Spain, where it is ſaid, " That whereas it has been repre-
" ſented by the Miniſter of the moſt ſerene
" King of Spain, that the reſtitution of
" Gibraltar with its harbour has been
" promiſed by the King of Great Britain,
" and that the King of Spain *doth inſiſt*,
" that Gibraltar with its harbour, and the
" iſland of Minorca with Port Mahon, be
" reſtored to his Royal Catholick Majeſty;
" it is declared by theſe preſents, on the
" part of his ſacred Imperial and Catho-
" lick Majeſty, that he will not oppoſe the

* See Commons Journals, vol. 21. p. 285. which contains both the original in French, and the tranſlation above ſtated.

" ſaid

" ſaid reſtitution, if it be effected in an " amicable manner: and that, if it be " thought neceſſary, he will make uſe of all " good offices for that purpoſe; and if the " parties deſire it, he will alſo act in the " affair as mediator." In fact, the reſtitution of Gibraltar has been the great object of Spain for theſe many years paſt; and the real cauſe of the antipathy which that country bears to England, which nothing but giving up that place will ever eradicate.

Nor is the dignity of the crown of Spain alone intereſted in the re-annexation of Gibraltar, but, in fact, it is alſo neceſſary in a financial and commercial view. Whilſt it remains an emporium in the hands of Great-Britain, many articles may with eaſe be ſmuggled both in and out of Spain; and hence the revenues of that monarchy, and of the province of Andaluſia in particular, muſt ſuffer great defalcation. Nor can the commerce of Spain ever be ſafe from the depredations of the States of Bar-

bary, whilſt that port remains in our poſſeſſion for their ſhelter and protection.

GIBRALTAR, at the ſame time, is a place that ought not to be given up for any ſlight conſideration. If the honour or intereſt of Spain demands its reſtitution, the honour of Great-Britain is intereſted in its preſervation, unleſs ſolid and ſubſtantial grounds can be aſſigned for the contrary. We ought not to forget, that on the 18th of March 1728, the Lords ſpiritual and temporal and Commons in Parliament aſſembled, jointly came to this reſolution: "That they entirely re-"lied upon his Majeſty, that he would, for "the maintaining the honour and ſecuring "the trade of this kingdom, take effectual "care to preſerve his undoubted right to "Gibraltar and the Iſland of Minorca *." After ſuch a reſolution it is impoſſible, conſiſtently with the dignity of this kingdom, to relinquiſh that poſſeſſion for any trifling compenſation.

* Comm. Journ. vol. 21. p. 25.

AFTER

AFTER conſidering, therefore, the pretenſions and intereſts of both parties, perhaps the advice given by that reſpectable author M. Rouſſet ought to be adopted, in which he recommends, that the poſſeſſion of that fortreſs ſhould be given up to Spain, "pour un equivalent qu'elle pourroit donner aux Anglois dans l'Amerique Septentrionale, ou dans quelques Iſles du Golfe du Mexique.*" Spain, it is ſaid, has taken the hint, by offering Porto Rico in exchange; and it is intitled to a ſerious inveſtigation, how far the poſſeſſion of that iſland, if added to other advantages, ought to be accounted an adequate compenſation.

EVERY one muſt at firſt ſight perceive, that no compariſon can be made between a barren rock and an iſland which yields to none in the Weſt Indies for its productions and fertility. It is an iſland which, as Abbé Raynal well obſerves, would make the fortune of any active nation; nor are the objections which are commonly urged againſt

* Intereſts des Princes, tome 1. p. 632.

our acceptance of ſuch an equivalent, of any great importance.

Some are of opinion, that it is of little conſequence to obtain the poſſeſſion of an iſland ſo little cultivated as Porto Rico; not conſidering what an advantage it is to have freſh ground to work upon, unexhauſted by its former proprietors. Our Weſt-India poſſeſſions, Jamaica only excepted, are almoſt worn out: and it is a deſirable circumſtance to have a new field opened for our induſtry and exertion.

By others it is demanded, where it is poſſible to procure either men or money for the cultivation of ſo large an acquiſition.

To this it may be anſwered, that it is probable, that the inhabitants of the ſmaller iſlands now in our poſſeſſion, will gradually emigrate there from eſtates already exhauſted. But were that ſuppoſition ill-founded, and were no emigrations even to take place from

from this country, yet every friend to Great-Britain muſt rejoice, that ſuch an aſylum could be afforded to thoſe unhappy Refugees, whoſe loyalty to their Sovereign, and whoſe affection to the conſtitution of this Country, has proved the means of injuring, if not totally deſtroying the property they poſſeſſed. It is probable, that this deſcription of men would ſoon form a new colony, whoſe induſtry would increaſe the commerce of a ſtate, which on its part might wholly rely on their adherence and fidelity.

The only remaining objection is, an idea which prevails with ſome, that now, when the Independence of America is acknowledged, the new States will ſoon ſwallow up the whole Weſt-India Iſlands; and therefore, that it is idle to waſte the wealth of England in the cultivation and improvement of an acquiſition, the advantages of which will probably be reaped by other people.

The rapid increaſe of the new States of North America, is with me a more problematical

tical point than it is generally ſuppoſed. The great ſource of their former proſperity was this: That, protected by the Mother-Country, favoured with every encouragement which it could poſſibly beſtow, and ſubject to inconſiderable taxes, that proſperity was totally unobſtructed. But their ſituation for the future may poſſibly be different: factions may break forth; diviſions may take place in their public councils; and heavy taxes may be exacted to ſatisfy the ambition and avarice of their leaders, which their commerce, if it receives no particular encouragement from any other ſtate, will be totally unable to ſupply.

But if events of a very different nature take place, and if they flouriſh as much as their warmeſt friends can deſire; yet whilſt we retain the port of Halifax, which may be deſervedly accounted the Gibraltar of North America, their enmity is not to be dreaded. That port, which muſt ſoon become the moſt valuable perhaps in any country, will always be a ſtation that will enable us

to

to preſerve our Weſt-India poſſeſſions againſt any enemy whatſoever. Nor ſhould any encouragement be wanting to ſtrengthen and improve a colony whoſe importance is yet unknown.

INDEED there ſeems to be an abſurdity in building any hypotheſis at preſent on a ſuppoſition that an intimate connexion between Great-Britain and America ſhould not again take place. When once the memory of the late unfortunate diſſentions is obliterated from the minds of both nations, it is probable that thoſe natural ties by which they are linked together will have their effect. If both are wiſe, neither will be backward. Connected with this country, America muſt flouriſh; but if ſhe truſts to the inſidious arts of France, ſhe will probably become a prey to the wily arts of that court, the only profeſſed practitioner of thoſe principles which Machiavel has ventured to recommend.

I HAVE

I HAVE thus ſhortly examined the three great points which ought to be conſidered in reſpect to Gibraltar; and as the object of this paper is to enable every one to judge of this important queſtion, I have added in the Appendix, a ſhort liſt and account of the different works which have been publiſhed on the ſame ſubject, which the reader may conſult who has not formed an opinion from the materials that have been laid before him. The author is decidedly of opinion, that the reſtitution of Gibraltar ſhould be no obſtacle to a peace, and that it ought to be reſtored to Spain, provided full and adequate compenſation is received. He diſlikes a poſſeſſion that is principally retained out of ſpite to a neighbour, whoſe feelings on the ſubject we may judge of by putting this queſtion to ourſelves: What would England ſay to a treaty of peace that ſurrendered Portſmouth to the Spaniards?

LET us alſo conſider for a moment, if the war is proſecuted for another campaign becauſe we refuſe to exchange Gibraltar with the

the Spaniards, to what an enormous expence ſuch a circumſtance will ſubject us. We muſt conſider, if the war continues on account of that fortreſs for only one year, that twelve or fifteen millions more muſt be added to the national debt, and 8 or 900,000l. per annum to the national taxes. If we are able therefore to make peace at the end of the next campaign, retaining Gibraltar, we ſhall dearly pay for the imaginary advantages attending that poſſeſſion.

THE author has thus diſcharged the duty that is incumbent upon every citizen of a free ſtate, that of explaining to the Public his ſentiments on a great, important, and national queſtion. As an individual, he feels himſelf totally unintereſted, in what manner it is determined. As a friend to his country, he hopes that reſolution will be adopted, which in the end will be found the beſt calculated for its real intereſt, and permanent proſperity.

APPENDIX.

NUMBER I.

THE following are the heads of the ſpecific demands given in by her Britannick Majeſty, on the 5th of March 1712; from which it will appear, that no idea was entertained at that time, that the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar and Minorca ſhould be annexed to the Monarchy of Great-Britain.

" THE French King ſhall expreſsly and " clearly acknowledge the ſucceſſion in the " Proteſtant Line of Hanover. That neither " he nor his heirs ſhall ever acknowledge " any other but her Majeſty, and her heirs " on that bottom. He ſhall ſend the Pre- " tender out of his dominions. He ſhall " neither

" neither ſecretly nor openly give any man-
" ner of aſſiſtance to any one whatever
" againſt her Majeſty, and ſuch her heirs
" as ſhall reign by virtue of the act of par-
" liament ſettling the ſucceſſion. A treaty
" of commerce ſhall be immediately en-
" tered into. He ſhall deſtroy the fortifica-
" tions of Dunkirk at his own expence,
" in two months after the peace, and never
" again cleanſe the harbour, or repair them.
" He ſhall by actual deeds, to be tranſmitted
" on the day of ſigning the peace, reſign St.
" Chriſtopher's, Newfoundland, Placentia,
" and the other iſlands about them—Acadia,
" Annapolis Royal, or Port Royal, and the
" country depending on them. He ſhall
" reſtore Hudſon's Bay and Streights, with
" the country, ſeas, coaſts, rivers, places
" and forts belonging thereto. The limits
" betwixt theſe and the French, not only
" to be fixed, but neither ſide to paſs thoſe
" limits either by ſea or land. He ſhall
" reimburſe the Hudſon's Bay Company for
" all their loſſes cauſed by the French, du-
" ring this war. The French ſhall neither

" diſturb our commerce between the Indians
" and us, nor diſturb the five Indian nations
" or Cantons, or others under obedience.
" He ſhall give juſt and reaſonable ſatiſ-
" faction to all the other allies in their
" demands. He ſhall own the Electoral
" dignity of Hanover, with all the rights
" and prerogatives belonging thereto. That
" the demands of ſuch allies as have not yet
" ſent their plenipotentiaries, ſhall be heard
" in the ſame manner as the reſt when they
" come. That the clauſe added to the
" fourth article of the treaty of Ryſwick
" ſhall be aboliſhed, and that France ſhall
" not oppoſe the ſettling religion in the Em-
" pire according to the treaty of Weſtphalia.
" That the demands in favour of the French
" Proteſtants, be diſcuſſed in the negocia-
" tion with the Miniſters of thoſe Princes
" who have concerned themſelves in it.
" Her Majeſty demands ſpeedy juſtice to the
" Houſe of Hamilton, Colonel Charles
" Douglas, and others her ſubjects whoſe
" lands have been taken from them. He
" ſhall

" ſhall give juſt ſatisfaction to her friends,
" to be named in this negociation, for loſſes
" and damages ſuffered by France, with the
" re-eſtabliſhment of their liberties and
" privileges."

NUMBER II.

ACCOUNT of eſſays which have been written at different times, to prove the propriety or impropriety of retaining Gibraltar.

1. " CONCORDIA Diſcors: or, an argument
" to prove that the poſſeſſion of Dunkirk,
" Port Mahon, Gibraltar, and other places,
" by the Engliſh, may be of worſe conſe-
" quence to theſe nations, than if they had
" ſtill continued in the hands of the French
" and Spaniards: to which is added, The
" hiſtory of ſtanding armies, from their firſt
" being ſet on foot, to this time, with
" the diſmal conſequences that have always
" flowed from them. Printed anno 1712."

THIS

THIS tract exclaims loudly againſt our retaining Gibraltar, and the other places mentioned in the title; the principal ground for which, is the terror which the author entertains of a ſtanding army. Dunkirk, he ſays, could not be rendered tenable under 10,000 men, nor Gibraltar and Minorca under 15,000 between them: this, with 7000 upon the Engliſh, 4000 upon the Scotch, and 12,000 upon the Iriſh eſtabliſhment, would amount to 48,000 men; a force ſufficient of itſelf to make any prince abſolute, who inclined to give way to a paſſion for unlimited authority.

2. "A LETTER to the lords commiſſioners "for trade and plantation, concerning the "advantage of Gibraltar to the trade of "Great Britain, with ſome propoſals to "render that place more uſeful. By a "Turkey Merchant. To which is prefixed, "a chart to the Mediterranean ſea. Printed "anno 1720."

THE

THE hiſtory of this tract is ſaid to be as follows: In the year 1717, Admiral Cornwall being at Gibraltar, made it his buſineſs to inform himſelf fully of the true ſtate of that place in regard to trade, and other public advantages; and among the reſt, procured the written opinion of a Mr. John Beaver, with different hints for the advantage of that fortreſs. The Admiral died at Liſbon, before he could reach England; and his papers fell into the hands of his ſecretary, who publiſhed this paper, principally taken from Mr. Beaver's Memorial, under the fictitious name of a Turkey Merchant. It contains hints which ought to be attended to, if Gibraltar is retained.

3. "CONSIDERATIONS offered upon the "approaching peace, and upon the im- "portance of Gibraltar to the Britiſh "Empire; being the ſecond part of the "Independent Whig. Printed anno 1720."

THIS

THIS is a warm defence of the propriety of retaining Gibraltar, ſuppoſed to be written by Mr. Gordon, the well-known tranſlator of Tacitus. He conſiders the retaining Gibraltar to be not only neceſſary as a curb to Spain, but as a thorn in the foot of France, and an obſtacle to its greatneſs. Modern politicians are apt to entertain a very different opinion. They ſeem to think, that no circumſtance would tend more to break the ties by which France and Spain are linked together, than the removal of all jealouſy between Spain and England, which the reſtoration of Gibraltar would probably occaſion.

" 4. CATO's Letters, No. 1, dated the " 5th November, 1720."

THIS is another paper written by Mr. Gordon againſt reſtoring Gibraltar, at a time when that ſubject was the general topic of converſation. Cato's Letters are too well known to require any account of them in this place.

" GIB-

5. "GIBRALTAR a bulwark of Great "Britain; in a Letter to a Member of Par- "liament, containing ſome conſiderations "on the importance of that place, in "reſpect to our trade in general, but par- "ticularly with regard to Barbary, Spain, "France, &c. With propoſals for erecting "a civil magiſtracy there, and for leſſen- "ing the annual expence of the Crown in "maintaining that Garriſon. By a Gen- "tleman of the Navy. Printed anno 1725."

THIS is a ſenſible and well-written Pamphlet. It ſtates in a favourable light the advantages of that place, and makes ſome propoſals for its benefit, which, if it ſhould be retained, are entitled to public attention.

6. "THREE Letters relative to the Navy, "Gibraltar, and Port Mahon, wrote in "the year 1747 and 1748. Printed anno "1757."

This is by far the beſt work that has been written upon the ſubject. The author well remarks, that the Miniſters of this country never acted as if they intended to keep poſſeſſion of Gibraltar, but as if they only waited for a proper opportunity to deliver it up. The poſſeſſion of both Gibraltar and Minorca, he obſerves, is greatly advantageous to the nation, but of the two, Minorca is by much the moſt valuable; not only as it can be kept with greater eaſe, and has one of the fineſt harbours in the world, but alſo becauſe it gives leſs umbrage to Spain, with whom it is our intereſt to live upon good terms.

Nor is it in proſe alone, that the ſubject of Gibraltar has been treated of in the Engliſh language. A poem entitled "Calpe, or, Gibraltar," has been written, of the melodious ſtrains of which the reader will be able to judge, from the following deſcription of the capture of that fortreſs by the Engliſh.

"Fate heard and laugh'd; for ere two ages roll'd,
"Or Spain had eight ſucceeding monarchs told,

"Lo

" Lo her dread fleet Imperial Anna ſends!
" Which o'er the main in dreadful pomp extends;
" From diſtant Bœtic plains and faithful vines,
" Aſtoniſh'd peaſants ſaw the tow'ring pines;
" Of Britiſh thunder heard the rolling peals,
" And call'd on ſaints to ſink the hoſtile keels."

THE END.

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"In pride, in reasoning pride, our error lies,
"All quit their spheres, and rush into the skies;
"Pride still is aiming at the blest'd abodes;
"Men would be angels, angels would be gods.—
"Cease then; nor order imperfection name,
"Our proper bliss depends on what we blame."

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